

Foucault, Agamben: Theory and the Nazis

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It was “a threatening world which could crush us . . . a situation that had to end.” “Waiting for the dawn,” was how he described it. What was he, Michel Foucault, talking about, this state of provisionality, this vast power bearing down, yet still permitting the expectation of change? About the experiences of a boy—the son and grandson of local medical worthies—who attended Catholic school (Saint-Stanislas, situated with unwitting irony on the intersection of rues Jean-Jaurès and l’Ancienne Comédie) in wartime in a small conservative provincial town, with a portrait of the *Maréchal* on the wall, in the bosom of a community itself neither ecstatically supporting nor resisting authority. *Himself*, in other words—as an adolescent growing up under Philippe Pétain’s gaze in Vichy France amidst the German occupation, with its bombing raids, its unexplained sudden disappearances, shortages, arrivals. “Our private life,” he later recalled, “was truly threatened. Perhaps that is the reason why I am fascinated by history and by the relationship between personal experience and those events amid

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

which we find ourselves. I think that this is the point of departure of my desire to theorise.”¹

It is the historian’s professional deformation to look for explanation in genealogies and roots. And so I wonder about the ways in which Foucault’s early experiences shaped his conception of power. True, he himself did not write or talk very much about that period (something, as we will see, that puzzles Giorgio Agamben). Yet the world of “ambient Vichyism”—as he termed the atmosphere from which Liberation liberated him—would seem to fit rather closely his model of power—all-embracing, almost suffocating, participatory and deeply connected to the body through authority’s obsession with fertility, national health, regulation, and discipline. “*Almost suffocating*”—because there is that promise of something better, some sense—implicit in the nature of military occupation itself—that the situation one finds oneself in is only provisional. One could put this in familial terms, too. Against the conformist father—the professor of anatomy—who wanted his son to follow the family tradition, Foucault had from the outset the example of his mother and her very different advice: “The important thing is to govern oneself.” Whether and in what ways this might be possible were questions Foucault continued to set for himself for the rest of his life.²

If one is curious about where Foucault’s theory of power came from—why, in the second half of the twentieth century, there emerged this challenge to the traditional emphases on formal institutions, the claims of law and material economic strength, this new focus on disciplines, on intellectual formations as techniques of rule, on a kind of (one even might call it) *collaborative* micropolitics—then at least part of the answer, I suspect, lies in this effort to think through the lived experience of wartime French authoritarianism. One of Vichy’s most striking political characteristics was the element of continuity with what came before and after it—a continuity often masked by the rhetoric of change. The young Foucault noted this and hated it. “The experience of the war had shown us the urgent need of a society radically different from the one we were living in,” he noted in a much later interview, “this society [note his emphasis on *society*] that had permitted Nazism, that had lain down in front of it, and that had gone over en masse to de Gaulle. A large section of French youth had a reaction of total disgust toward all that. . . . We wanted a world and a society that were

1. James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 39; Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 27.

2. Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 21.

not only different but that would be an alternative version of ourselves: we wanted to be completely other in a completely different world.”³

If the same social forces and political elites could move, it seemed smoothly, from the Third Republic to collaboration with the Nazis and then into the era of Gaullism. Foucault does not draw from this the conclusion that there are no significant differences between totalitarianism (I’ll come back to this word: *authoritarianism* would be better) and democracy, only that there are connections, resemblances, and continuities of practice. But in fact Foucault does not deal much with the question of totalitarianism at all. The vast bulk of his work ignores the twentieth century, even though it has subsequently enjoyed enormous influence in helping us rethink that century. Although the recent historiography of both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia would be unrecognizable without him, he himself visited the subject of totalitarianism only rarely and—it is my impression—reluctantly. Charged once with obscuring the differences between totalitarian and democratic states, he denied this by avowing his commitment to the historical method:

I always analyse precise and locally delimited phenomena—for instance, the formation of disciplinary systems in eighteenth-century Europe. I don’t do this as a way of saying that Western civilization is a disciplinary civilization in all its aspects . . . I make a distinction between governors and governed. I make an effort to explain why and how these systems came into existence at a particular time, in a particular country, to satisfy certain needs. I don’t speak of societies that have no geography or calendar.⁴

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Agamben’s case is somewhat different, both in the timing of his birth and in his overall approach. Born in 1942, he came of age in a country

3. Michel Foucault, *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), 248.

4. Foucault, *Power*, 292. He goes on to argue that “of course techniques of power can be transposed. . . . But I have never argued that a power mechanism suffices to characterise a society. . . . The concentration camps? They are considered to be a British invention. But that doesn’t mean, or authorize the notion that Britain was a totalitarian country. . . . I’ve never said, and I am not inclined to think, that the existence of concentration camps in both democracies and totalitarian countries shows there are no differences between those countries” (293).

deeply ambivalent about its own political past, uncertain whether Benito Mussolini had completed the nationalist project or derailed it. Even more egregiously than in France, the vast bulk of the state apparatus made the transition smoothly enough from the Duce's Roman Empire to the democratic U.S.-led Free World; the cost was borne mainly by those on the left who had actually resisted fascism during the war, who found themselves on the losing side after 1945. They were not as badly off, perhaps, as their Greek counterparts, but the repression that faced them was no less effective for its relative discretion. In the early 1960s, at the age that Foucault had been on the eve of Liberation, Agamben lived through the trauma of the attempt to reinsert neofascism into mainstream Italian political life. Some years later, the "historic compromise" between the Italian Communist Party and Christian Democracy confirmed for many on the Italian left the bankruptcy of the entire parliamentary system. Hostility to parliamentarism *per se*, deep suspicion of the state—these are important features of Agamben's thought. One of the main ways in which this hostility and suspicion expresses itself is in his analysis of Nazism.

Agamben goes to Foucault for his starting point—to his conception of "biopolitics." As Agamben notes, although Foucault coins this term, he does not really develop it. It emerges, in fact, at the very end of the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France in 1975–76, a moment in which Foucault was starting to turn away from his former concerns and think about new avenues of inquiry. The lectures as a whole discuss the idea of war as a model for politics (and history) through the works of a number of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors. Only in the final lecture does Foucault introduce the term *biopolitics* in order to highlight a shift in the idea of sovereignty. Once, sovereignty basically resided in the right to put to death. Since the late eighteenth century, though, it has come to mean both the right to "let die" and—rather more importantly for Foucault—the right to "make live"; the state is now concerned not merely with disciplinary effects on individual bodies but on the management of an entire population. Hence—and here the shades of Vichy return—the new practices of "biopolitics"—demographic statistics, natalism, public health and welfare measures in general. The nineteenth-century injection of state racism transforms and radicalizes definitions of "what must live" and "what must die." Implied though unstated in all this was a radically new agenda for twentieth-century history: away from endless class analyses, away from the emphasis on the irrationality and barbarism of fascist violence, toward a new stress on social and governmental rationality and the political role

of the human sciences, connected to social and racial policy in the context of modernity. In a few lines, Foucault sketched out the path that two generations of historians have followed. It was, by any measure, a remarkable achievement.

What he did not do—neither there nor, to my knowledge, anywhere else—was to go further into the question of Nazi violence, the camps and the mass murder of the Jews in particular. At the start of his 1995 work *Homo Sacer*, Agamben wonders why Foucault failed to make the connection between the idea of biopolitics and “the exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century.” One answer might be that Foucault did not think they *were* the exemplary places of modern biopolitics. Agamben’s answer is instead to draw attention to the “difficulties and resistances that thinking had to encounter in this area.” For his part, he derives inspiration from Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism, though he notes that she in her turn failed to connect this to Foucault’s insights on biopower. One way of seeing Agamben’s project is the effort to bring these two thinkers into dialogue.⁵

It is hard to summarize in a few words Agamben’s complex and sometimes obscure chain of thought. He begins by making a distinction between what he calls “bare life” (*zoi*) and life once it enters the realm of politics (*bios*)—a process which, according to him, started with the first Greek *polis* and which now “constitutes the decisive event of modernity” (4). He then draws on Carl Schmitt’s work on the state of exception, arguing that this is the “hidden foundation” on which the entire political system rests. And he draws too on Schmitt’s idea of a “*nomos* of the Earth.” For Schmitt, writing in April 1939, such a division of the Earth was *desirable*: following the German invasion of Prague, Germany looked forward to dividing up the earth with the United States, Britain, Japan, and Italy; for Agamben, on the other hand, it is a gloomy prospect and a synonym for global oppression. And another difference too: while both are critical of liberal universalism, Schmitt was a conservative, looking back to the nineteenth-century world in which European public law held sway; Agamben evinces no nostalgia for any historical era at all. On the contrary, he sees “an inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism” and looks forward, evok-

5. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 3–4. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically by page number.

ing Benjamin's vision of "divine violence," to a "new historical epoch" and to the "new politics, which remains to be invented" (10, 63). The state of exception, for Schmitt, was heuristically important—the exception *defines* the rule, or helps to understand it. For Agamben, it takes on a sociological quality: "in our age . . . the state of exception comes more and more to the foreground . . . and begins to become the rule" (15).

The second part of *Homo Sacer* turns to the subject of the title—the man, bare life, who may be killed with impunity. He represents the embodiment of the Schmittian exception, the space outside the law, the banishment of sacred life. In Roman times, says Agamben, he was a lone individual. But, he warns us, "in our age, all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as *homines sacri*" (111). An especially striking case, he goes on, is that of "the Jew living under Nazism," who could be killed without fear of punishment (115). And thus the paradigm of Jews in the Third Reich takes him into a discussion of "The Camp as Biopolitical Paradigm of the Modern." Now Agamben sets out to do what Foucault failed to do, to connect the theory of biopolitics to life in the totalitarian camps. Stressing the totalitarian experience becomes a way of reminding us of democracy's failings too—it is not only Nazism and Soviet Communism that aim at global rule and total domination; the political centrality of "biological life and its needs" explains why democracies were able to turn so quickly into totalitarian states, and the latter, almost without interruption, into parliamentary democracies. "Traditional political distinctions (such as between Right and Left, liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public) lose their clarity and enter a zone of indistinction" (122). Because the camps are the "hidden paradigm of modernity," they shed light on the nature of modern politics in general: Auschwitz, roundups of illegal Albanian immigrants in Bari stadium, Weimar's camps and the *zones d'attente* in French airports all manifest the *essence* of the camp—they materialize the state of exception (122–23, 174–75). Foucault's approach is the opposite. In 1977, regarding the Gulag, he says, "reject the universalizing dissolution of the problem into the denunciation of every possible form of internment. The Gulag is not a question to be posed for any and every country."⁶

Almost at the very end of this book, Agamben introduces a figure—the *Muselman*—whom he then treats at much greater length in his 1999

6. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 137–38.

Remnant of Auschwitz. The *Muselmann*—or “Muslim”—was the camp inmate who had so lost touch with the world as to enter the realm of pure biological being, existing in an intermediate state between humanity and death. He represents the figure of the “untestifiable”—the limits to the validity and possibility of testimony in Auschwitz (although in fact some testimonies of former “Muslims” end the 1999 book). Agamben is not very interested in the history of the camps per se. For him, the major historical questions have been “sufficiently clarified,” while the same “cannot be said for the ethical and political significance of the extermination” (11).

Except that Agamben does not really talk about extermination. He invokes the emblematic power of Auschwitz—its “uniqueness”—yet his accounts of camp life come back again and again to life in the concentration camps, not the death camps, and his remarks about “indeterminate life” only make sense in the context of the former. He is really concerned with Auschwitz as the expression of a general kind of “limit situation” that will allow him to illuminate the horrors of the “normal” (48). This is why he insists that the Nazi camps are exemplars of reality and remarks that they were “not merely the place of death and extermination” but also “and above all, the site of the production of the *Muselmann*”—the incarnation of “absolute biopolitical substance”—as close as we get to bare life in this age (85).

What happens when critical theory utilizes history, tracking and identifying “paradigms of modernity” for the sake of a philosophy? How are such paradigms chosen and constructed, and how much does the stature of an argument rise or fall on the accuracy of the historical reading? Agamben’s sources are eclectic and conceptually influential. From David Rousset, as Sam Moyn has pointed out, he gets the idea of a “concentration camp universe.” From Arendt, he takes the idea of totalitarianism as a political model and the idea that such regimes pursue absolute power. And from Wolfgang Sofsky’s *The Order of Terror*, above all, he derives the sociological elaboration of totalitarianism in a kind of synthesis of Arendt and Rousset. Influenced by Arendt’s conception of power, Sofsky offered a view of Nazism that dismissed the utility of social history or indeed any historical analysis of the SS leadership and its goals. (Let us note that he was writing against a tendency in Germany at that time to exculpate junior SS men by portraying the SS as an undifferentiated whole: his goal was a form of historical prosecution.) Sofsky followed Arendt in arguing that the camps were laboratories designed for the exercise of pure absolute dominion rather than, say, for production or security (however defined). But Sofsky also noted (as

Agamben does not) that the survivor testimonies he had relied upon came mostly from political prisoners, not Jews—a fact of some importance given Agamben's stress on the emblematic position of the Jews in the biopolitics of the Third Reich. But the key point is that for Sofsky, differences of time and place across “the concentration camp universe” did not matter, since “a relatively small number of reports from various camps is enough to arrive at a typifying description.” What he describes, rather as did the historian Raul Hilberg—whom Agamben acknowledges as another source—are the workings of a rather efficient machine, a machine of mindless bureaucratic terror and violence, a machine without beginning or end.⁷

For Agamben—and certainly not only for him—the camps constitute a warning from history. It is perhaps not surprising that the age of the War on Terror and Enduring Freedom, of renditions and Guantánamo, sees extraordinary interest in his ideas. But maybe the camps also provide a warning of a different kind. There are, in the first place, camps, and then there are camps. In the summer of 1939, there were probably about 1.5 million prisoners in the Soviet Gulag; at that time, the figure for the Third Reich was 21,400. So point one: the term *totalitarianism* hides more than it reveals—in this case, vast divergences between the Nazi and the Communist camp experiences. Ideology mattered, policy mattered—these were *very* substantial differences in trajectory and function. If the German camps before the war were the most extensive in Europe, they paled before the Soviet system. But the German inmate numbers grew extremely quickly during the war itself: by August 1942, they had reached 115,000; by early 1945, they were up to over 700,000. The number of camps had grown from less than 10 in 1935 to over 10,000 a decade later. How far is it legitimate to ignore this astonishing growth in favor of the static image of a frozen “concentration camp universe”?

Far from constituting some kind of stable “order,” therefore, the German concentration camps were rapidly changing, fast-growing, and diverse. At the same time, “absolute power” was by no means as sure of itself or its aims, as Arendt, Sofsky, and Agamben suggest. If we demystify Auschwitz and put it back in its historical context, we can see that it was a latecomer and an oddity—the largest of only two combined labor and death camps, chosen deliberately by Heinrich Himmler for expansion, first to cre-

7. Samuel Moyn, *A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France* (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press; Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2005), 158–63; Wolfgang Sofsky, *The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 15.

ate a slave labor reservoir for his mind-bogglingly vast and violent plans for postwar eastern Europe—General Plan East—and then, when those plans had to be shelved, to help make the SS indispensable as a wartime supplier of labor to the corporations being attracted by the regime to invest in Upper Silesia. Once Himmler saw that providing wartime labor might be a good route for the SS to go down, he reshuffled the camp administration, purged many of the commanders, tried several for corruption, and ordered the mortality rates to be brought down—as in fact they were for a time. All this is not to say the SS was more benign than we usually think; most of these plans were unwittingly sabotaged by the violence of the SS personnel themselves. Only the idea that the camps were designed to be a deliberate experiment in metaphysical domination can be regarded as nothing more than a gross simplification. What appeared to prisoners to be a deliberate policy of “annihilation through work” was in fact the product of vicious infighting and disagreements among their masters, a mark as much of regime failure as success.⁸

Beyond these historical objections there is a more fundamental question. What makes one choice of historical symbol or paradigm better than another? In short, why choose Auschwitz? Before it became the destination for European Jewry, two dreadful things had happened—so quickly that they escape Agamben’s commentary. One he does not mention at all—the death by starvation, illness, and cold of more than 2.1 million Soviet POWs in German camps and holding pens between late 1941 and early 1942. (It was their death, unforeseen if not unplanned, coinciding with continued Soviet resistance to the German onslaught, that led Himmler to build up Auschwitz and promote his managerial rationalizers to try to run the camps.) More died in this fashion than died in Auschwitz, and in a shorter period of time. But there was no gas, no *Sonderkommandos*, and no SS bureaucracy: just some overstretched Wehrmacht guards; too little food; inadequate shelter, transportation, or medical supplies. An unforeseen and unparalleled wartime catastrophe came and went, leaving few traces or published testimonies.

Then there was the entirely distinct operation—outside the remit of the concentration camp administration—run secretly in occupied Poland in 1942–43, called Operation Reinhard. Poland had the largest Jewish popu-

8. See Peter Black’s review of Jan Erik Schulte, *Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung: Das Wirtschaftsimperium der SS; Oswald Pohl und das SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt, 1933–1945* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2001), in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 351–55.

lation in Europe outside the USSR, and most of them died not in Auschwitz but in four small locations in the Polish woods, powered mostly by modest engines producing carbon monoxide: approximately 2 million people were killed there in a matter of months. The Reinhard camps were already winding up their operations as Auschwitz expanded; at the moment of its greatest destructiveness, in the summer of 1944, they had already been leveled. Yet in these camps, too, there were no *Muselmänner*, no survivors (or almost none), no grey zones, no indeterminacy.

My impression is that for Agamben these differences, these statistics, stories of growth and decline, are all ultimately beside the point. He is not interested in historical change but in what he sees as the deeper meaning, the potentiality, that interpretation may glean from certain historical occurrences. His main concern is to find clues that will allow us to move toward redemption, to chart the course to a new politics, a way out of a fallen world. He searches constantly for the *essential*, the *originary*—something to pluck from time. Totalitarianism's emblematic quality serves chiefly to remind him of the dangerous potential of our own time: the extermination camps, he says in 1993 (referring, I think, to Omarska), are "starting" to be reopened. That this makes for bad history may not matter very much. Of more concern should be its implication for the very ethics he claims to value. His redemptionist vision awaits—and here one notes Agamben's debt to Martin Heidegger—the moment in which all will change, and discounts the possibility of meaningful action in the existing political order. When he does find an instance of resistance to admire—as in the Chinese demonstrators at Tiananmen Square—he highlights their sense of politics as gesture and "the relative absence of specific contents in their demands." He follows Arendt in highlighting the refugee as the testing case for Western rights talk, but emphatically unlike her he welcomes the collapse of citizenship, sovereignty, and the nation-state.⁹ Around him everything is crumbling—sovereignty is the "empty shell of a state in decline," the nation-state faces "unstoppable decline." Viewing the admittedly dismal prospect of Italy in the early 1990s, Agamben's existential gloom moved momentarily into overdrive: the entire system was discredited, and "a whole people finds itself speechless before its own destiny." Everywhere there is betrayal, bankruptcy, and conspiracy. The Left is "collaborating" with the Right, "in exactly the same way that the working class was spiritually and

9. Giorgio Agamben, *Means without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

physically disarmed by German Social Democrats before being handed over to Nazism.”¹⁰

It isn't, perhaps, surprising that Agamben's mind often returns to interwar Germany; its cultural pessimism—from both far Right and Left (Walter Benjamin)—its contempt for liberal democracy, and its suspicion of the United States, rapidly becoming (in Schmitt's phrase) “the arbiter of the world,” clearly resonate. Radical despair—not uncommon on the far Left in southern Europe—explains in particular Agamben's affinity with Heidegger. Passing discreetly over Heidegger's moment of political rapture in 1933 (“we are under the orders of a new reality”), Agamben presents him—not entirely inaccurately—as the theorist of precisely the form of anti-politics—withdrawal—which he admits as the only possible and authentic response to modern biopolitics. Yet I am reminded of the critique made of Heidegger by the Weimar sociologist and “philosophical anthropologist” Helmuth Plessner. Plessner was a resolutely anti-utopian modernist (who embraced what he called modernity's “horizon of possibility,” a concept not so far removed from Foucault's later work). In his 1931 essay “Power and Human Nature,” Plessner attacked Heidegger's existential concepts for their indifference to history. A “perspective of the absolute,” he noted, produced contempt for the entire political sphere. In words that could perhaps be applied to Agamben too, he wrote that history was not the “stage” on which “in accordance with some context, the bearers of extra-temporal values have their entrances and exists”; rather, it is “the place of production and destruction of values.” Plessner criticized Heidegger for his “political indifferentism”—precisely the quality in him which appeals to Agamben.¹¹

Did Foucault's analysis of power permit any greater degree of engagement with politics than this? Power is not repression, he is fond of saying; it circulates and passes through the individual, through networks. Sometimes it sounds as though it can penetrate everywhere, coextensive with society, leaving, as he once put it, “no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its networks.” More than once some objected that this seemed to leave no place for resistance or worthwhile opposition. On this point Foucault was clearly torn. One response he sometimes made was to present resistance as a necessary part of the same overall dynamic as power. But while pos-

10. Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights,” in *Means without End*, 15–16, 23, 112.

11. Helmuth Plessner, *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft: Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1924); on the 1931 essay, see Rüdiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 205–7.

sibly true in a Hegelian sense, this was hardly an encouragement to act. “What use can one finally make of all this in everyday political struggles?” he was asked in 1976. He struggles to answer, confessing finally: “All of this must seem very confused and uncertain.” Yet more and more, especially near the end of his life, he came down in favor of political action, of—as he put it—defending the community of the governed against *abuses* of power. “Abuses”: hard to imagine the early Foucault, or Agamben, saying that. In 1984, Foucault supported human rights; a decade later came Agamben’s call to get beyond them, to separate the “refugee” from “human rights”—a kind of novel embrace of Heidegger’s postwar claim that “homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world.”¹²

The two very different wartime paradigms that I have highlighted are intended to illuminate the contrast between these two thinkers and their understanding of power and history: on the one hand, Foucault’s model of diffused state power—the model of “ambient Vichyism,” if you will; on the other, Agamben’s model of the inside/outside biopolitical tyranny of the concentration camp. One sees biopower as a marker of modernity; the other takes it as “the bare essence of politics as such.”¹³ These divergent approaches are accompanied by differences of method and approach as well: for Foucault, a historicized view of the past that brings with it the possibility of a political ethics in the present; for Agamben, despair with what passes for political reality and indifference to historical change brightened only by the dream of ultimate redemption, some new “beautiful life.” But if the alternative to a “beautiful life” is no life at all? Faced with such a choice, Foucault seems not only to offer a more subtle and less partial reading of history but to conserve the very possibility of action as well.

12. Foucault, “Confronting Governments: Human Rights” (1984), in *Power*, 126–33 (esp. 132), 142, 474–75; Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights,” 21; Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in *Basic Writings from “Being and Time” (1927) to “The Task of Thinking” (1964)*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 243.

13. See Philippe Mesnard’s fine essay “The Political Philosophy of Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Evaluation,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 139–57, esp. 142.